

Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

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Connectivity and DCFTA: What Happened to Trade and Foreign Direct Investment ?

Eastern Partnership External Relations Workshop:

,Connectivity in EU's Wider Eastern Neighbourhood'

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DCFTA in a nutshell

- Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is a part of the Association Agreement with the EU
- **AA/DCFTAs** with GE, MD and UA were negotiated since 2008/2010/2012 and signed during 2014, provisionally in force since 2016.
- **DCFTA** covers:
 - Trade-related aspects: conventional FTA aspects focusing on reduction of tariff duties and rules of origin;
 - 'Deep' aspects: relate to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including food safety and SPS measures, technical standards, national treatment, public procurement, services liberalization and customs administration;
 - Comprehensive' aspects: wide scope of approximation to EU 'acquis' regarding national treatment, customs and trade facilitation, trade in services, intellectual property, e-commerce, energy market, public procurement, anti-trust and competition, etc.






Additionally, DCFTAs contain


- Approximation to the EU acquis communautaire (both current and future)
- Transitory arrangements (e.g. special regime for worn clothing and passenger cars for UKR; gradual elimination of duties in MDA and UKR), etc.
- Temporary (during 2014-2015) autonomous concession of the preferential access to the EU market
- ➢ Barriers to trade: tariff rate quotas (TRQs), TBTs and SPS regulations.



Recent foreign trade developments: Georgia

- Exports to the EU down by 10% in 2014-2016, yet up by 16% in 2017 and 17% in 2018
- Imports from the EU down by 7% in 2014-2016, and flat in 2017; up by 13% in 2018
- Persisting trade deficits: EUR 5 billion in 2018 (of which EUR 1.6 with the EU)






Source: National statistics.





Recent foreign trade developments: Moldova

- Exports to the EU up by 28% in 2014-2016, up by another 22% in 2017
- Imports from the EU down by 8% in 2014-2016, up by 18% in 2017
- Widening trade deficits: EUR 1.9 billion in 2017 (of which EUR 0.6 with the EU)




Moldova - imports





Recent foreign trade developments: Ukraine


- Exports to the EU down by 5% in 2014-2016, yet up by 27% in 2017
- Imports from the EU down by 3% in 2014-2016, yet up by 19% in 2017
- Widening trade deficits: EUR 5.6 billion in 2017 (of which EUR 2.9 bn with the EU)



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


Ukraine top exports, 2017 (40% of the total go to EU) annual growth 2016-2017 (Y: +19%) and shares in total (X)






FDI inward stocks per capita, in EUR








Georgia's inward FDI stock by main investors, EUR 16.3 billion, end-2017






Moldova's inward FDI stock by main investors, EUR 2.5 billion, end-2016





Ukraine's inward FDI stock: EUR 39.9 billion (end-2017) Top 10 investors in % of total



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Facit:

- > Uneven trade performance: Moldova is doing better than others
- Exports highly concentrated, early signs of restructuring (MD, UA)
- ➢ Widening trade deficits, also with the EU
- ➢ FDI stocks still low, especially compared to CEE peers
- Sources of FDI questionable (round-tripping, capital flight, etc.)
- > DCFTA should facilitate FDI inflows (from the EU, beyond Cyprus)
- ➢ More pro-active FDI policies needed: lessons from CEEs

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Challenges of the 'frozen conflicts'

- All three DCFTA countries suffer:
 - Georgia: South Ossetiya and Abkhasia (600 th people directly affected)
 - Moldova: Transnistriya (500 th people directly affected)
 - Ukraine: Crimea (2 mn) and parts of Donbass (nearly 3 mn people directly affected)
 - This is about 15% of the population in each country.
- Formally, DCFTA applies to the whole country
- Yet, de facto, "frozen" conflict territory is not covered and DCFTA implementation is hindered even beyond the "freeze".
- Will DCFTA foster a "de-frosting" or a "climate change"?



Policy recommendations

Pillar 1: Background conditions and public awareness

- •Establish supportive macroeconomic and political background conditions.
- •Institutional reforms directly relevant for the business environment should be prioritised and accelerated.
- •More effort should be put to increase specific rather than generic awareness of AA/DCFTA by stakeholders.
- •Cross-border dialogues between the business communities of the EU and the DCFTA countries should be enhanced to facilitate incorporation of the DCFTA industries in the European and global value chains

Pillar 2: Strategic sequencing of reforms and gradualism

- •Careful sequencing of reforms to target competitiveness and market access challenges.
- •Better accounting of adjustment costs and pragmatic gradualism of implementation is needed to balance costs and benefits over time.
- •Long-run economic strategy should be developed or adjusted with the medium-run and long-run impacts of AA/DCFTA in mind.
- Diversify export markets and attempt to normalise relations with Russia.

Pillar 3: Increased financial and technical support from the EU with strict conditionality

- •More financial and technical assistance should be provided to the private and the public sector in the DCFTA countries.
- •Strict conditionality of financial assistance should be enforced.
- Effective monitoring should be enforced and a functional scoreboard system developed to systematically track progress of reforms along multiple dimensions.
- •A competition element for the EU funding needs to be introduced and a mix of merit-based and need-based financial aid opportunities should be further developed.





Key policy recommendations for DCFTA countries

Pillar 1: Background conditions

- Supportive macroeconomic, institutional and political background is crucial.
- More efforts to raise specific awareness of AA/DCFTA by all stakeholders.
- External pressure necessary, yet domestic ownership of reforms still crucial !
- Support cross-border linkages between the businesses and other stakeholders, including SMEs, to facilitate incorporation in global value chains.
- "Frozen conflicts" resolution; normalization of relations with neighbours.



Pillar 2: Strategic sequencing of reforms

- Priority of reforms targeting exports, competitiveness and market access via FDI.
- Pragmatic gradualism in implementation, balancing costs and benefits over time.
- Long-term economic development strategy coordinated with the medium- and longterm impacts of AA/DCFTA.
- Diversify export markets and attempt to normalise trade relations with neighbours.



Pillar 3: Increased financial and technical support with strict conditionality

- More financial and technical assistance to both the private and the public sector.
- Address issues related to the lack of domestic technical and other expertise.
- Strict conditionality of financial assistance should be enforced.
- Effective monitoring and a functional scoreboard system developed to systematically track progress of reforms.
- A competition for the EU funding with a mix of merit-based and need-based financial aid opportunities.





Thank you for your attention!

See the full report Adarov A. and P. Havlik (2016): "Benefits and Costs of DCFTA: Evaluation of the Impact on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine" and the Policy Brief (2017): "Challenges of DCFTAs: How can Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine succeed?"

Both available at:

Bertelsmann Stiftung http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/ Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies http://wiiw.ac.at/



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