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Monthly Report

JULY/AUGUST 2019

A New Initiative on Migration and Refugee Policy

Various Domains of Integration of Refugees and their Interrelationship: A Study of Recent Refugees in Austria

Doctors on the Move: The Mobility Patterns in the EU

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche

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CONTENTS

Chart of the month: Labour market integration of non-EU migrants and refugees 1

Opinion Corner: A new initiative on migration and refugee policy 4

Various domains of integration of refugees and their interrelationship: A study of recent refugees in Austria 10

Doctors on the move: the mobility patterns in the EU 16

Monthly and quarterly statistics for Central, East and Southeast Europe 23

Index of subjects – July-August 2018 to July-August 2019 47

Chart of the month: Labour market integration of non-EU migrants and refugees

BY SEBASTIAN LEITNER

INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Immigration from non-EU countries into the EU28 surged in 2015 as 1.3 million refugees - about four times more than the average in the period 2000 to 2013 - applied for asylum. The majority of those fleeing from civil war zones originated from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. In 2016 the number of applications remained at the same level but halved in 2017 and 2018. More than half of the refugees were granted asylum, subsidiary or humanitarian status.

Obviously, an immediate concern was the integration of those refugees into the labour market of the host countries. Labour market research shows that humanitarian migrants face more difficulties in finding jobs than other migrants. Since they have been fleeing from conflicts in the countries of origin, their migration was usually not planned in advance. Therefore, they often lack necessary skills, language proficiency, and social and cultural capital. At the same time, refugees have only very restricted access to the labour market during the asylum application procedure in most EU countries. Thus, employment participation of humanitarian immigrants is expected to be low in the first two years after arrival, when many of the refugees are still waiting for the authorities' decision.

Figure 1 / Employment rates of non-EU28 migrants in EU15 countries

in % of working age (15-64) population, 1st quarter 2016 and 1st quarter 2019



Source: Eurostat, own calculations.

Figure 1 shows the change in the employment rate of non-EU28 migrants between the first quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2019. Since LFS data for refugees only is not available, we refer to a

broader population group as reported by Eurostat: non-EU28 migrants (refugees were the most dynamic subgroup therein in the period 2016 to 2019). As the number of asylum applications surged, the employment rate of non-EU28 immigrants in the EU15[1] declined from 53.8% in the 1st quarter of 2011 to 52.5% in the 1st quarter of 2016. In the following three years up to the 1st quarter of 2019, the economic upswing improved the situation in the EU labour market in general – the employment rate of the total population rose from 66.3% to 68.8% during this time. However, in the case of non-EU28 immigrants, the increase was much stronger: their employment rate rose by 4.2 percentage points to 56.3% - despite the fact that the number of those immigrants increased by 9% in this period. Labour market integration thus accelerated in the recent period – the efforts of EU host countries by implementing adequate policies and the lively labour demand supported this positive outcome.

INTEGRATION IN AUSTRIA

In the case of Austria we can analyse the labour market integration of immigrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran – countries that filed the majority of asylum applications in the recent years (Figure 2) in more detail.

Figure 2 / Citizens from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran in the Austrian labour market

Shares of persons in different labour market status in total working age (15-64) population, in %
1st quarter 2016 and 1st quarter 2019



Source: Statistics Austria, BMASK – Bali database, own calculations.

The labour market situation for men of working age in this population group changed dramatically in the period from the 1st quarter of 2016 to the 1st quarter 2019. In 2016, more than 60% of them were inactive - the labour market status of asylum seekers in the application phase. Thereafter, their employment rate increased from 15% to 48%, while at the same time the share of those being in training[2] also rose to 21%. The latter also cushioned the increase in the number of unemployed; their share only rose from 7% to 13%.

1 The EU-CEE countries are not analysed here since the number of non- EU migrants, including refugees, in these countries is still very low.

2 The figures include only the courses financed by the Austrian public employment service.

However, in the case of women the situation looks rather different. The share of inactive is still on the rise while the one of employed declined to 14%. Apart from well-known reasons like child care, the very different labour market situation of men and women in 2019 can be explained by the fact that they came in different phases of refugee immigration. While initially the majority of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran were men, the share of women increased in the most recent years, also due to the possibility of family reunion being used. From 2016 to 2019 the number of female citizens from Afghanistan, Syria, Iran and Iraq residing in Austria increased by 50%, while the male group by only 13%.

From the literature and the prior experience with the refugees from Ex-Yugoslavia in Austria we know that labour market assimilation is typically a long-term process. However, the developments of the very first years after arrival suggest that the speed of economic integration of the recent refugees is likely to be faster than expected by many in 2015.

Opinion Corner*: A new initiative on migration and refugee policy

Is there a window of opportunity for the new European Commission to embark upon such an initiative?

BY MICHAEL LANDESMANN

This opinion piece explores the need and the opportunity for the new EU Commission to make some strides towards an EU-wide coordinated migration and refugee policy. This is against the background of the looming complementarity in the demographic dynamic between the European continent and the neighbouring non-EU regions (Middle East, Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa). These provide very strong 'push' and 'pull' forces for migration and refugee flows over the coming decades.

Migration is an important aspect of global and regional integration. Statistics show that migration flows worldwide have increased over the past decades alongside other features of international integration such as increased international trade, foreign direct investment and international knowledge flows. This has happened in parallel with increasingly restrictive migration controls at the global level, especially in advanced economies.

International studies have shown that there are interdependencies between migration flows and other channels of international integration. Thus, a number of migrants from a particular country encourage bilateral trade and foreign investment flows, as migrants support such flows through their knowledge of, and their linkages with, the country they come from. And, vice versa, trade and international companies' activities bring along movements of people as - through these economic interactions - they get to know each other's countries, their language, culture, and educational, job and entrepreneurial possibilities. Hence, the age of 'globalisation' is also an age of increased international personal mobility and of migration.

PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

From an economic point-of-view, 'push' and 'pull factors' drive international migration flows while migration and mobility restrictions provide the legal and institutional context in which such forces unfold. The traditional push and pull factors prominently considered by economists are income gaps and differences regarding employment opportunities between source and (potential) destination country. Hence a migration decision also implies a location choice, i.e. which destination country or region to go to.

* Disclaimer: The views expressed in the Opinion Corner section of the Monthly Report are exclusively those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official view of wiiw.

An important additional factor in determining the direction of migration is the existence of 'migrant networks', i.e. migrants often come from the same source country or region as migrants who are already in the destination country. Such 'networks' can provide support and information about a variety of issues that are of importance to a would-be migrant (including housing, employment possibilities, how to deal with local authorities, facilities for family and children, and a cultural context in a foreign environment). Models developed to study migration flows usually find highly significant effects of network linkages and these provide an important inter-temporal 'pull effect' (see also Collier, 2013[1]).

MIGRATION AFFECTING DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOURCE AND DESTINATION COUNTRIES

Another factor, albeit less well captured by economists, is the interrelated demographic dynamic between source and destination countries of migrants, i.e. the impact which migration flows have upon population growth as well as upon the age and gender compositions of the source and destination countries' populations. This aspect is particularly important for the current and future demographic composition of European societies.

Figure 1 shows how migration flows affect overall population growth in both net immigration and net emigration countries. Thus over the period 2017-2050, a country such as Austria is projected to experience (without inward net migration) a fall of 13 percentage points in its population. However, considering likely projected net immigration flows, Austria's population is likely to rise by 18 percentage points. On the other side, take the case of Romania: here the fall in its population would be about 8 percentage points without considering net emigration (due to natural population growth, i.e. considering the birth and death rates of its population over the period), but it changes to a fall of 18 percentage points when also considering the likely migration out of the country over this period.

Figure 1 / Shrining prospects



Source: Eurostat, Economist.com.

[1] Collier, P. (2013), Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century; Penguin, London.

We can thus see that migration flows in Europe, both from one EU country to another and of extra-EU migration flows into the EU, can have significant impacts on overall population projections. This has to be added to the well-known fact that migrants are predominantly in the young age group, i.e. in the 18-30 age range (follow-up migration through family reunion is somewhat different regarding both age and gender). Furthermore, as migrants are usually relatively well educated compared to the educational attainment levels of not only the source country but also often relative to those of the host country's population, we can see that migration can have a significant impact not only on the age structure of the population but also on the human capital of both source and destination countries.

Hence, migration flows (and also mobility patterns across regions within a country) often have a '*polarisation effect*' with the countries/regions of destination gaining in labour force (as most migrants are of working age), improving the age structure of its population (with positive impacts on sustainability of its social security system) and also gaining in human capital. The source countries or regions, on the other hand, usually lose out in all three of these dimensions: emigration could lead to a significant contraction of population, the speeding up of an ageing population process and also lead to a loss of, or shortages in, important segments of the more qualified. Furthermore, studies also show that the impact on labour force and the age structure will have significant impacts on the 'age bias' of fiscal spending more generally (see e.g. Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2010)[2]. These processes can have cumulative effects on the development potential of countries and regions with destination countries and regions gaining and source countries and regions losing.

SOUTH-NORTH MIGRATION WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY PREVALENT IN EUROPE

These demographic considerations are important when evaluating both intra-European migration patterns as well as considering the relationships between Europe and the source regions in its non-European neighbourhood. Neighbourhood refers here in particular to the so-called MENA countries i.e. the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa, and also to sub-Saharan Africa which is projected to double its population by 2050 to about 2 billion people.

However, there is a big difference in the characteristics of migration patterns within Europe over the past decades (i.e. since 1989), which was mostly due to *East-West migration*, as compared to the migration flows between Europe and the MENA and sub-Saharan African countries which can be referred to as *South-North migration*. East-West migration is migration between countries that can be both characterised as 'ageing societies' with very few exceptions such as Albania which has a relatively young population. The demography in the MENA region and of sub-Saharan Africa is, on the other hand, characterised by a very young population. Hence, purely from a demographic point-of-view there is a dramatic 'demographic complementarity' between Europe and its non-European potential source regions. In my view, this demographic complementarity is going to strongly affect the expected migration flows over the coming decades.

East-West migration is going to ease as the remaining populations in Eastern European countries have undergone a strong ageing process, many of those who are most willing to leave have already left and

[2] Tepe, M. and P. Vanhuysse, Elderly bias, new social risks and social spending: change and timing in eight programmes across four worlds of welfare, 1980-2003; Journal of European Social Policy; 2010; 20 (3), 217-234.

the countries neighbouring Western and Northern Europe have undergone a relatively successful catching-up process thereby reducing income and wage gaps. Furthermore, the 'bulge' of East-West migration associated with gaining full access to EU labour markets has already taken place. There is still the Western Balkans where 'push' factors are still present but it is a smaller region and EU accession and access to labour markets is still far away.

The situation is quite different with respect to the non-European neighbourhoods: take the example of the MENA region where the population has been projected to grow to 492 million in 2025 (from 316 million in 2000) and to 638 million in 2050 (UN Population projections). In contrast, the population of Western and Central Europe is supposed to remain relatively stable at around 466 million. If we just consider the potential labour forces (defined as population aged between 15 and 64), the MENA would have a labour force reservoir which would grow from 323 million in 2025 (from 187 million in 2000) to 417 million in 2050; while the labour force in Western and Central Europe is supposed to shrink from 295 million in 2025 to 251 million in 2050. Hence the discrepancy in the demographic dynamic between these two neighbouring regions is striking. In addition to these demographic characteristics there is the rather fragile situation with regard to the economic development prospects of the MENA region, particularly concerning the employment prospects of the young labour force. Furthermore, the region is subject to significant geo-political interventions leading to wars and political and social instability. All of these act as powerful 'push factors'.

CHALLENGES FOR POLICYMAKERS

From a policy point-of-view this poses dramatic challenges for European migration policies which – if not handled well – could cause strong conflictual divisions within Europe and also between Europe and its non-European neighbourhoods. We already witnessed such divisions during the refugee crisis of 2015-16.

So how should Europe and the EU proceed in relation to these challenges? The 'efficiency case' for coordinated action on migration policy as well as working towards a harmonisation of policies towards refugees at the EU level is very strong. In some areas this has been recognised even though little coordinated action has taken place so far. These include the following:

› Control of external borders

› Strong engagement with neighbouring countries in gaining their support to deal with refugee inflows and illegal immigration

› A major development initiative to support economic, social and political stabilisation in the regions which are, and will be, the sources of potentially massive migration flows into Europe.

In all these areas the benefits of 'economies of pooled resources' and of increased joint bargaining power from coordinated actions are obvious. Nonetheless, despite these topics being high on the agenda of many of the high-level Council meetings, little progress has been made in these areas so far. What are the reasons for this?

BORDER CONTROLS

The issue of 'control of external borders' is where the most concrete decisions have been taken so far. Thus, the decision has been taken that Frontex personnel would be increased to 10,000 persons. However the funding is still not committed and there are also important disputes regarding the decision-making powers of Frontex agencies vs. the national authorities of 'border states'. On the one hand, border countries in Southern Europe are worried about the loss of sovereign control over their migration and asylum policies. As long as allocation schemes regarding the distribution of refugees and the joint responsibility for the costs of processing asylum applications are not agreed across EU member states, they will not agree to allow Frontex to make decisions with regard to the intake of migrants and refugees. On the other hand, there is the highly politicised stance of the Visegrád countries (and not only those) to boycott any plans regarding an EU allocation scheme or even accepting the principle of joint responsibility for any EU-wide migration and refugee policy. The divergence of positions also makes the prospect of revising the outdated Dublin Agreement (which imposes full responsibility for processing asylum applications to the first country of entry into the EU) very unlikely.

COOPERATION WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

As regards an active engagement with neighbouring countries, thereby exploiting the enhanced bargaining power and resources that could be mobilised in joint initiatives, this again suffers from the non-existence of plans on how to deal collectively with migrants and refugees that would be dealt with outside EU territory. This is a 'chicken and egg' situation: any joint initiatives in neighbouring countries to deal with migration and asylum applications requires an agreement on resource sharing and joint rules on migration and asylum procedures to be in place already. Therefore, given the great difficulty in reaching joint agreements on migration and refugee policies amongst EU countries, the willingness of neighbouring countries to cooperate will remain low.

TIME FOR MORE STRATEGIC THINKING FROM THE EU

Lastly, what about a major development policy initiative with regard to the large geographic region of potential source countries where the bulk of future migration flows is expected to come from (i.e. the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa)? Given the current climate of fiscal stringency with regard to mobilising major resources to top up development aid in European economies, it is hardly likely that the boost to development aid will in any way reach the level of a 'Marshall Plan' for Africa and the Middle East that some commentators advocate. Nonetheless, more resources have been planned to support neighbouring regions in the forthcoming financial plan of the European Commission. From the development literature it is, on the other hand, well-known that there are clear limits in the extent to which external resources can significantly contribute to economic, social and political stabilisation of developing countries (see e.g. Easterly, 2006[3]). Thus, although more resources will be devoted to this end, they are unlikely to amount to a massive up-grading of development aid to Africa and the Middle East or have a major impact on economic and political stabilisation, especially as the EU will remain a minor player in the geopolitics of both regions.

[3] Easterly, R. (2006), The White Man's Burden: How the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good; Penguin, London.

On the other hand, I feel that there is some room for manoeuvre for the incoming new European Commission and also the more 'enlightened' governments in the European Union to make some progress in developing a more sensible migration policy. One reason is that there has been an 'ebbing away' of both the refugee flow of 2015/16 as well as the memory of these flows. We have also seen that migration flows from the Central and Eastern European countries, which joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2011, are beyond the initial 'bulge'. This provides some political space.

These two factors were – in my view - responsible for a relatively favourable outcome in the last European Parliament elections where the parties that ran first and foremost on the migration issue did not win as many seats as expected. Italy is an exception, particularly because the refugee wave was very visible in that country, but even more likely because the 'strong man' tactic by Matteo Salvini in exploiting the overall economic and social crisis Italy has been successful so far, given the shambles linked with all the other parties (both the one in government and those in opposition). The situation is not unlike that in Hungary.

The EU can thus use the political space to make progress in an incremental and technocratic manner. This might not look like the 'big throw' but might nonetheless be effective in the longer-run. Circular migration and training schemes might be gradually negotiated (with both the neighbouring regions and with the Western Balkans) leading to mutually beneficial developments of migration policies between source and host economies.

Furthermore, trade policies especially with regard to Africa and the Middle East might be designed to emphasise the developmental potential in migration source countries (at the moment they show a strong legacy of protectionist pressures especially from the agricultural lobby; but this might change as other economic and political interests make themselves felt). As mentioned earlier, there is great potential in exploiting complementarities between trade, international investment, local business development and joint efforts in controlled mobility and migration policies between Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Incremental efforts of private, state and EU actors will, hopefully, be able to tap these. Thus, there are grounds to believe that there might be some prospects of a persistent effort being made in these directions over the period of the next Commission.

Various domains of integration of refugees and their interrelationship: A study of recent refugees in Austria

BY MICHAEL LANDESMANN AND SANDRA M. LEITNER

Refugee integration is a complex and multifaceted process which can be hampered by various obstacles. In this article we report results from the analysis of a unique survey among refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq who have recently come to Austria. We not only identify the key determinants of their labour market and social integration but also show that both domains of integration are interrelated. Our results point to important policy implications.

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, Austria faced one of the largest waves of refugees it had faced since 1945. The Ministry of Interior reported 88,151 asylum applications in 2015, predominantly from Afghans (29 percent), Syrians (28 percent) and Iraqis (15 percent) that together accounted for more than 70 percent of the total. Integrating these refugees into the Austrian economic and socio-cultural fabric is a significant challenge which is complicated by the fact that refugees are diverse in terms of age, cultural and religious background, languages spoken and levels of education. Refugee integration is a complex and multidimensional two-way process which depends not only on refugees and their experiences, skills and needs but also equally on the host community, society and state.

Against this backdrop, we have used a unique survey among recent refugees in Austria not only to identify the key determinants of their labour market and social integration but also to show the direction as well as the extent of interdependencies among these two domains of integration. As concerns social integration, we distinguish the concept of social network from that of social capital. Social networks refer to the circle of friends, peers, acquaintances and professional contacts and the type and intensity of relationships between these different people, which can have both positive and negative influences on the people involved. In contrast, social capital refers to the concrete resources, help and support garnered from networks (Foley and Edwards, 1998).

DATA SOURCE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The data stems from the FIMAS+ INTEGRATION survey (ICMPD, 2018). It is a unique survey dataset which aimed at capturing the integration processes of recent refugees of working age (between 15 and 60 years of age) particularly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq in Austria over various dimensions. It was conducted between December 2017 and April 2018 in the five Austrian provinces of Vienna, Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg, and Tyrol, either through face-to-face interviews (CAPI) at various refugee,

education and employment organisations, online questionnaires (CAWI) or self-administered questionnaires (tablet/PC, CASI).[1]

The survey comprised of around 1,640 refugees. Around 55 percent of the refugees in the sample were from Syria, 21 percent were from Afghanistan while 14 percent were from Iraq. The majority of refugees were male (79 percent) - which corresponded to the composition of the refugee population in Austria - who were eligible for asylum or subsidiary protection and came to Austria mainly in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (see Figures 1 and 2 below).

Figure 1 / Demographic characteristics of sample: Citizenship, gender and resident status



Source: FIMAS+ INTEGRATION survey.

Figure 2 / Year of arrival in Austria, by country of birth



Source: FIMAS+ INTEGRATION survey.

[1] Interviews were conducted by trained interviewers (native speakers) either in German, Arabic or Farsi, depending on interviewees' preference and language proficiency. Similarly, online questionnaires were also available in German, Arabic and Farsi.

For the quantitative analysis, the sample was further restricted to refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria who came to Austria after 2010 and had a resident status which granted them access to the labour market (i.e. entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection or any other title which granted access to the labour market). From this sample, women and refugees below 18 years of age were also excluded due to their heterogeneous behavioural patterns which would otherwise have affected our results.

DOMAINS OF INTEGRATION

Labour market integration is captured in terms of people's labour market status, namely as (i) *unemployed* (and registered at AMS (Austrian Government Employment Office) as searching), (ii) *inactive* due to, for instance, maternity/parental leave, studying/training, ill health/physical disabilities, household responsibilities, or other reasons, and (iii) *employed* and in paid employment (any type of unpaid, voluntary work is excluded). In our analysis, we used the group of unemployed as a reference category and compared it with the group of inactive and employed persons.

As concerns social integration, we accounted for its complexity and multidimensionality and distinguished the concept of social network from that of social capital. *Social networks* are measured not only by the size of the network but also how frequently contacts are made with the people within the network which is measured on a six point scale ranging from never to daily. We further distinguished social networks by their ethnic composition and differentiated between *networks with Austrians* and *co-ethnic networks* that are only with people from the same country of birth.

Social capital was measured by means of six different survey questions which captured whether respondents '*know someone in Austria who …* ' (1) '*would help you move or renovate your apartment*', (2) '*would draw your attention to a job vacancy*', (3) '*you could discuss personal problems with*', (4) '*would assist you in completing a form from public authorities*', (5) '*lend you 200 Euro*', or (6) '*you could have a pleasant time with over coffee or tea*'. By construction, this set of questions referred to the total social capital and did not differentiate between social capital related to Austrians or to people from the same country of origin.

To capture the complexity of social integration (SI), the following different indices were created (these correspond to the column headings in Table 1):

› Total SI index: total social network plus total social capital
› Austrian SI index: social networks with Austrians only plus total social capital
› Co-ethnic SI index: co-ethnic social networks with people from the same country of birth plus total social capital

This broad concept of social integration was further broken down into its key constituent parts, namely social network and social capital to form additional SI indices:

› Total network index: total social network
› Austrian network index: social networks only with Austrians
› Co-ethnic network index: social networks only with people from the same country of birth
› Social capital index: total social capital a person can rely and fall back on for help and support.

Table 1 / Labour market and social integration: Total and by country of birth

	Unemp.	In-active	Emp.	SI-TOT	SI-AT	SI-COB	NETW-TOT	NETW-AT	NETW-COB	SC-TOT
Total	**47.7%**	**15.3%**	**37.0%**	**0.513**	**0.442**	**0.569**	**0.189**	**0.143**	**0.184**	**0.615**
AFG	31.1%	22.5%	46.4%	0.556	0.467	0.604	0.199	0.146	0.186	0.649
IRN	39.2%	30.4%	30.4%	0.535	0.453	0.579	0.200	0.148	0.206	0.639
IRQ	51.1%	14.3%	34.6%	0.510	0.452	0.570	0.187	0.155	0.156	0.616
SYR	51.1%	13.3%	35.6%	0.507	0.435	0.561	0.189	0.139	0.191	0.610

Note: All social integration indices were standardised to lie between 0 and 1.

Table 1 provides an overview of the extent of labour market and social integration for the total sample as well as by country of birth. It shows that labour market integration – expressed in terms of the share of refugees in each labour market category – varies widely. In particular, almost half of all refugees in the sample were unemployed while only around a third were in paid employment. Furthermore, labour market integration differs across ethnic groups: while most (up to half in some instances) of all refugees from Iran, Iraq and Syria were unemployed, most refugees from Afghanistan were in paid employment. Moreover, the social integration of refugees differed across its various dimensions but was generally higher with respect to co-ethnic networks. Co-ethnic networks were strongest among refugees from Iran and Syria but weakest – and of similar importance as networks with Austrians – for refugees from Iraq. Likewise, social capital was highest for refugees from Afghanistan and Iran and lowest for Syrian refugees. We should keep in mind that some of these differences across refugee groups would be due to differences in the length of stay in Austria (see again Figure 2); this was accounted for in the econometric analysis conducted with the dataset, the findings of which are reported in the following section.

FINDINGS[2]

Our results demonstrate that labour market and social integration are strongly interrelated such that socially more integrated refugees are also more likely to be in paid employment (or in inactivity) and that refugees in paid employment (or in inactivity) are also more socially integrated. However, interesting differences can be observed between the various dimensions of labour market and social integration. In this respect, refugees in paid employment are socially better integrated in general than inactive refugees. Furthermore, refugees in paid employment are not only socially better integrated with Austrians but can also rely on more social capital. In contrast, inactive refugees are socially better integrated with their co-ethnic networks but have little additional social capital to fall back on.

Furthermore, labour market integration is determined by a set of additional factors. The probability of being in paid employment is higher among refugees who are better educated, have lived longer in Austria, or have a better command of German, particularly in terms of speaking and understanding German. In contrast, the probability of being in paid employment is lower among Muslim refugees or refugees who live in Vienna, Styria or East- and Southeast Austria (Lower Austria, Burgenland and Carinthia taken together). Further analyses show that provincial differences are predominantly the result of the worse general labour market conditions in these Austrian provinces.

[2] A full account of the econometric analysis conducted will be available in Landesmann and Leitner (forthcoming).

The probability of being inactive is higher among younger refugees, who are primarily in education or training and therefore inactive in the labour market, or unmarried refugees. Conversely, the probability of being inactive is lower among refugees who live in East and Southeast Austria.

Similarly, several factors determine the various dimensions of social integration. For instance, social networks with Austrians are more important for refugees with a better command of German. In this respect, speaking, understanding and reading German are of high importance while writing German matters little. Additionally, social networks with Austrians are stronger for refugees who live in Upper Austria or intend to stay permanently in Austria. By contrast, social networks with co-ethnics are more important for Muslim and Christian refugees (relative to refugees of no religious belief) and refugees from Syria.

Social capital is higher for refugees with a better command of German – in terms of speaking, understanding and reading, but not writing – and who intend to stay permanently in Austria while it is lower for refugees who live in East and Southeast Austria.

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO DOMAINS OF INTEGRATION

Our study also looked at the causal relationship between the two domains of integration to determine whether higher social integration leads to higher labour market integration, and vice versa.

It provided some evidence that higher social integration causes better labour market integration, particularly in terms of better chances of refugees to find paid employment. From all of the different dimensions of social integration which were considered, the causal effect of social integration on labour market integration only emanates from stronger networks (not social capital), mainly with Austrians. The causal relationship from labour market integration to social integration could not be established since the necessary methodological preconditions remained unfulfilled.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This analysis used a unique survey of recent refugees in Austria from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. It established that labour market and social integration are strongly interrelated, and determined by different factors, some of which have important implications for policy. For instance, our results show that education is a key determinant of employment. This reinforces the need to make it easier for refugees to have their qualifications recognised in Austria, and to encourage and support their access to (further) education. Similarly, a good command of German is key to both labour market and social integration – particularly with Austrians – which underscores the importance of early and good quality language courses. Our study also provides some evidence that higher social integration causes better labour market integration. In particular, it shows that stronger networks with Austrians increase refugees' chances of finding paid employment. This shows that in addition to labour market integration measures, policies to enhance network development with Austrians are also key for the quicker and smoother transition of refugees into employment.

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Doctors on the move: the mobility patterns in the EU

BY ISILDA MARA

Half of the EU countries are already facing shortages of medical doctors which are likely to grow in the future. Attracting doctors from abroad has been a tangible and a quick solution to this, but affected negatively the 'sending' countries. This article provides a glimpse into recent mobility patterns of medical doctors in the EU and potential steps forward to address the shortages of doctors in EU-CEE countries.

LABOUR SHORTAGES IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

Health care is the sector where labour shortages across the EU countries tend to be quite severe, not least because of both the ageing population and baby boomers approaching retirement age. Between 2015 and 2017 medical doctors typically featured among the top five occupations affected by shortages.[1] Over half of EU countries report shortages of medical doctors and one third of 'nursing and midwifery professionals' (see Table 1).[2] The projected demand for health professionals in the EU is estimated to reach 4 million by 2030 - 3.6 million will leave the workforce and another 300,000 new jobs will be created in this sector[3] (in 2018 the number of health professionals in the EU was close to 6 million).

Medical doctors' personnel represent one third of health professionals. In the EU, an average of one out of ten medical doctors originates from abroad (see Figure 1) and the annual inflow of foreign-trained doctors corresponded to 25% of medical graduates. The mobility of foreign-trained doctors has not only positive but also negative effects. The main receiving countries - usually the wealthier ones - have in part tackled shortages of medical doctors through immigration of medical staff. However, this has quite often exacerbated shortages of medical doctors in the sending countries.

Table 1 / Occupational shortages of medical doctors and health professionals in selected EU countries

	BE	DK	DE	EE	IE	FR	NL	FI	UK	BG	HR	LV	LT	SI	SK
Medical doctors	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Nursing and midwifery professionals	■	■			■		■	■	■	■			■		■
Other health professionals	■			■	■	■	■	■	■					■	

Source: Own elaboration from European Commission (2017), page 17.

This article provides a glimpse into the recent mobility patterns of medical doctors and aims to provide a better understanding of their main drivers and their impacts on the EU countries. Accordingly, some of

1 European Commission (2018), page 24.

2 European Commission (2017), page 17.

3 Skills Panorama, European Centre for the development of Vocational training (CEDEFOP).

the questions we address are as follows: Which are the main receiving and sending countries of medical doctors in the EU? What drives the mobility of doctors both within and outside the EU and how does it affect their availability for the population?

Figure 1 / Share of foreign-trained doctors, in %



Source: Eurostat.

MEDICAL DOCTORS' MOBILITY AS A CHAIN REACTION

The data on inward and outward mobility of medical doctors in the EU between 2010 and 2018 suggest that some countries have been net senders (especially countries of EU-CEE), some others have been net receivers (as in the case of EFTA countries) while a third group of countries have been characterised both by an intensive outward and inward mobility of doctors (especially as concerns the EU15, see Figure 2).

Figure 2 / Inward and outward mobility of medical doctors by region, 2010-2018 cumulative



Source: Own elaboration using OECD Health Workforce Migration Dataset and Eurostat.

More specifically, EU-CEE countries supplied more than 40,000 medical doctors - mainly to the EU15. In contrast, the inflow of medical doctors to EU-CEE - close to 5,000 – a meagre compensation for those who left the region. Thus, the EU-CEE has been a net sending region and consequently has lost an important contingent of medical doctors.

At the same time, the EU15 has been characterised by a high internal mobility of doctors, a large inflow of doctors from both the EU-CEE and outside the EU, and, a high outflow of doctors to EFTA (mostly Norway and Switzerland), USA and Canada. Still, the net flow of doctors – the difference between inflow and outflow - into the EU15 has been positive.

Norway and Switzerland received more than 32,000 doctors – mainly from the EU28 – and in contrast, sent hardly any doctors abroad. As such the latter countries have been net receivers and especially benefited from the mobility of medical doctors from the EU28 (see Figures 1 and 2). Such mobility patterns suggest a domino effect, or a chain reaction, of doctors' mobility across the EU countries and its neighbouring regions.

MAIN RECEIVING COUNTRIES OF MEDICAL DOCTORS

The extent of doctor mobility has varied greatly across the EU countries (see Figure 3). The UK is the country which has attracted the highest number of foreign-trained medical doctors since 2010. More than half of them originated from countries outside of the EU – especially Pakistan and India; another 27% came from EU15 – a significant portion from Italy, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Germany – and another 16% originated from EU-CEE – especially Romania, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Apart from the high inflow of doctors from abroad, university graduates constitute another relevant source for medical doctors in the UK. Their number in absolute terms is one of the highest in the EU, although it is only slightly above the EU average in relation to total population (see Figure 4).

Figure 3 / Mobility of medical doctors and the number of graduates, cumulative



Source: own elaboration using OECD Health Workforce Migration Dataset and Eurostat.

Figure 4 / Number of health graduates per 100,000 inhabitants



Source: Eurostat.

Despite a high supply of medical doctors – both foreign and domestically trained – the number of doctors serving the population in the UK has only improved slightly since 2010 and stands below the EU average (see Figure 5). This is also reflected in shortages of medical doctors in the UK.[4] For the majority, the remuneration for health professionals in the UK deteriorated over time (see Figure 6). Such dynamics hint that the push for British doctors to leave the UK for more favourable destinations - e.g. New Zealand, USA and Canada – might be stronger. However, with the remuneration in this sector being higher than in most of the EU15, let alone EU-CEE and developing countries, the UK has managed to attract a large number of foreign-trained doctors from these regions.

Figure 5 / Number of medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants



Source: World Health Organisation.

[4] European Commission (2017), page 37.

Figure 6 / Gross monthly earnings of professionals in the health sector, in EUR at PPS



Note: Mean monthly earnings by sex, economic activity 'Human health and social work activities' and occupation 'Professionals' [earn_ses14_48].
Source: Eurostat.

Norway and Switzerland emerge as two countries which rely heavily on medical doctors from abroad. First these two countries have benefited from a large inflow of foreign-trained doctors while also having sent relatively few doctors abroad. Second, the inflow of medical doctors from abroad has been much higher than the number of graduates and consequently - apart from Ireland – they have the highest shares of foreign-trained doctors - close to 40% and 35% in Norway and Switzerland respectively. Switzerland in particular, as it offers much higher wages relative to the EU countries has been a magnet for doctors not only from Germany but also from Italy, France and Austria while Norway has been attractive for doctors mainly from Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Hungary. Accordingly, the high level of inward mobility of doctors from abroad has contributed to the rise of the number of available doctors as a share of the populations in Switzerland and Norway, which are both above the EU average.

MAIN SENDING COUNTRIES OF MEDICAL DOCTORS

The EU-CEE countries are the ones that have been the most negatively affected by mobility of medical doctors (see Figure 2). Across the EU-CEE countries, Romania stands out as the country with the highest level of outward doctors´ mobility (see Figure 3). For a number of other EU-CEE countries the net effect of doctors´ migration has been negative as well, e.g. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia. At the same time, the inward mobility of doctors into these countries has been negligible and well short of offsetting the outward mobility: the region received only 5,000 doctors during 2010-2018 and their shares of foreign-trained doctors are very low (see Figure 1). Czech Republic has attracted mainly doctors from Slovakia and Ukraine, Hungary from Romania, Romania from Moldova, and the Baltics mostly from Russia. Besides, the number of available doctors as a share of the population in EU-CEE countries tends to be rather low, well below the EU average, and it even deteriorated in some countries between 2010 and 2016 (see Figure 4).

Germany is another EU country which has recorded outflows of doctors on a net basis and is a good example of the above-mentioned domino effect. Not only has the outward mobility of German doctors been high, it also outpaced the high inflow of foreign-trained doctors into Germany. This means that the growth in the number of doctors in Germany has only been due to domestic medical graduates. Between 2010 and 2018, more than 14,000 German doctors preferred to move, mainly to Switzerland (close to 10,000), but also to Austria, the UK and countries outside the EU. This has been driven by high demand for doctors in these countries as well as the relatively higher wages they offered to health sector professionals. At the same time, relatively high wages in Germany relative to those in the EU-CEE have attracted a lot of doctors from this region – especially from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and Czech Republic, which together represented close to 60% of the total inflow of foreign-trained doctors to Germany between 2010 and 2018. The mobility of doctors from Austria to Germany has also been important – close to 1,500 (or 12% of total inflow of foreign-trained doctors to Germany), and exceeded the number of German doctors who moved to Austria.

While in Germany the inflow of doctors from abroad has compensated for 90% of the outward mobility, in Austria it made up for only 60%. The main destinations for Austrian doctors have been Germany, Switzerland and the UK. In contrast, Austria has attracted mainly German doctors, who accounted for 57% of the inflow of foreign-trained doctors to Austria between 2010 and 2018; doctors from EU-CEE – e.g. Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria - contributed another 34%.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

As was highlighted at the beginning, half of the EU countries are already facing shortages of medical doctors and these shortages will likely only grow in the future. Attracting doctors from abroad is certainly a practical and quick solution in the short and medium terms, at least for some countries. Overall, recent patterns of doctors' mobility suggest that the UK has in part made up for outward mobility of British doctors with doctors from EU-CEE, the EU-15 and countries outside of the EU. Norway and Switzerland have tackled shortages of doctors by importing doctors from the EU. Germany has largely compensated the doctors' outward mobility with inflows of doctors from EU-CEE. Romanian doctors are certainly a quick solution for shortages faced in the UK or Germany while doctors from Moldova might partly replace Romanian doctors who leave and Ukrainian doctors might also compensate in part for Polish or Czech doctors who move abroad. However, such a chain reaction, when not properly managed and regulated, generates negative spillovers for less wealthy countries – such as lower and poorer health care provision. Concerns are also growing about the public spending allocated for medical doctors' education. Governments might be reluctant to invest in this as long as the chances to retain domestically-trained doctors are low. For the most part, a relatively low level of earnings in the sector makes less wealthy countries less attractive for doctors from abroad.

So, what would be the ways forward to address the shortages of doctors in EU-CEE countries?

First, international mobility of doctors needs better management in such a way that it continues to be beneficial for wealthier countries, without being detrimental for less wealthy ones. Certainly, a win-win solution would be the implementation of exchange programmes for medical doctors, which would encourage short-term rather than long-term or permanent outward mobility of doctors, especially at the intra EU-level.

Another emerging way to address the shortages of medical doctors and health professionals in general would be increased automation. A number of countries have started to apply pilot projects in this respect, such as 'eHealth'[5] or online doctors,[6] or 'mHealth'[7] and 'telehealth' which might be particularly useful in those remote regions where the accessibility of medical doctors is more difficult. However, research has shown that only 4 to 7% of jobs among health professionals can be automated.[8] Therefore, the demand for highly-skilled health professionals is very likely to remain high.[9]

In conclusion, better management of international migration, automation and efficient allocation of resources invested in the further education and training of health professionals are policy areas which should complement each other in order to help satisfy the demand for doctors in the future.

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5 See more details about definitions here: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/mhealth

6 Santana et al (2010), Lopez et al (2018).

7 European Commission (2017).

8 Pouliakas (2018).

9 CEDEFOP (2019), https://skillspanorama.cedefop.europa.eu/en/analytical_highlights/health-professionals-skills-opportunities-and-challenges-2016

Monthly and quarterly statistics for Central, East and Southeast Europe

The monthly and quarterly statistics cover **22 countries** of the CESEE region. The graphical form of presenting statistical data is intended to facilitate the **analysis of short-term macroeconomic developments**. The set of indicators captures trends in the real and monetary sectors of the economy, in the labour market, as well as in the financial and external sectors.

Baseline data and a variety of other monthly and quarterly statistics, **country-specific** definitions of indicators and **methodological information** on particular time series are **available in the wiiw Monthly Database** under: **https://data.wiiw.ac.at/monthly-database.html**. Users regularly interested in a certain set of indicators may create a personalised query which can then be quickly downloaded for updates each month.

Conventional signs and abbreviations used

%	per cent
ER	exchange rate
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HICP	Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (for new EU Member States)
LFS	Labour Force Survey
NPISHs	Non-profit institutions serving households
p.a.	per annum
PPI	Producer Price Index
reg.	registered

The following national currencies are used:

ALL	Albanian lek	HRK	Croatian kuna	RON	Romanian leu
BAM	Bosnian convertible mark	HUF	Hungarian forint	RSD	Serbian dinar
BGN	Bulgarian lev	KZT	Kazakh tenge	RUB	Russian rouble
BYN	Belarusian rouble	MKD	Macedonian denar	TRY	Turkish lira
CZK	Czech koruna	PLN	Polish zloty	UAH	Ukrainian hryvnia

EUR euro – national currency for Montenegro, Kosovo and for the euro-area countries Estonia (from January 2011, euro-fixed before), Latvia (from January 2014, euro-fixed before), Lithuania (from January 2015, euro-fixed before), Slovakia (from January 2009, euro-fixed before) and Slovenia (from January 2007, euro-fixed before).

Sources of statistical data: Eurostat, National Statistical Offices, Central Banks and Public Employment Services; wiiw estimates.

Online database access



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Albania

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



*Positive values of the productivity component on the graph reflect decline in productivity and vice versa.
**EUR based.

Source: wiiw Monthly Database incorporating Eurostat and national statistics.
Baseline data, country-specific definitions and methodological breaks in time series are available under:
https://data.wiiw.ac.at/monthly-database.html

Belarus

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Bosnia and Herzegovina

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Bulgaria













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Croatia













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Czech Republic













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Estonia

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Hungary

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Kazakhstan

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Kosovo













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Latvia

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Lithuania













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Montenegro

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and lending rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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North Macedonia

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Poland













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Romania













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Russia

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Serbia













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Slovakia

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Slovenia













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Turkey

Real GDP growth and contributions
year-on-year



Real sector development
in %



Unit labour costs in industry
annual growth rate in %



Inflation and policy rate
in %



Financial indicators
in %



External sector development
in %



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Ukraine













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Index of subjects – July-August 2018 to July-August 2019

Albania economic situation 2019/6
Austria competitiveness at the micro level 2018/7-8
commuting and regional GDP 2018/9
export destinations re-examined 2018/9
FDI in CESEE 2018/9
integration of refugees 2019/7-8
Belarus economic situation 2019/6
Bosnia and Herzegovina economic situation 2019/6
Bulgaria economic situation 2019/6
China outward FDI 2019/1
Croatia economic situation 2019/6
strategy for euro adoption 2018/12, 2019/6
Czech Republic economic situation 2019/6
Estonia economic situation 2019/6
Hungary economic situation 2019/6
Italy new government; euro area membership 2018/7-8
Kazakhstan economic situation 2019/6
Kosovo economic situation 2019/6
Latvia economic situation 2019/6
Lithuania economic situation 2019/6
Moldova economic situation 2019/6
Montenegro economic situation 2019/6
North Macedonia economic situation 2019/6
Poland economic situation 2019/6
Romania economic situation 2019/6
Russia economic situation 2019/6
fiscal rule and foreign exchange market 2019/2
growth accounting, total factor productivity 2019/2
oil taxation reforms 2019/2
Serbia economic situation 2019/6
Slovakia economic situation 2019/6
Slovenia economic situation 2019/6
Turkey economic conundrum 2019/6
Ukraine economic situation 2019/6

(continued on the next page)

multi-country articles and statistical overviews

Central Asia regional trade integration ... 2019/4
deleveraging in CESEE ... 2018/12
digital revolution, robot adoption, and labour market ... 2019/5
economic integration EU – EAEU ... 2019/4
effects of NTMs on gross and value added exports ... 2018/7-8
EU cohesion policy ... 2018/10
EU disintegration ... 2018/10
EU FTAs, optimal degree of trade liberalisation ... 2019/1
EU trade relations with developing countries ... 2019/1
Eurasian economic integration ... 2019/4
European financial markets 10 years after the crisis ... 2018/12
European investment gap (European Silk Road) ... 2019/3
financialisation process in CESEE ... 2018/12
football and economics ... 2018/11
investment trends in CESEE ... 2019/3
Italy, euro area ... 2018/7-8
Luddite rebellion ... 2018/11
migration, global compact ... 2018/11
migration, EU policy ... 2019/7-8
migration of medical personnel ... 2019/7-8
natural interest rates ... 2019/5
New Silk Road, EU, EAEU ... 2018/7-8
outward FDI in EU-CEE11 ... 2019/3
permanent fiscal deficits ... 2018/10
polarisation of production structures ... 2018/10
telegraph revolution ... 2018/11
wages and emigration from the CEE ... 2018/9

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