

#### **University of Orléans, France**

Department of Law and Economics Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans, UMR7322



# Does FDI crowd out domestic investment in transition countries?

Cristina JUDE cristina.jude@univ-orleans.fr



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#### Motivation

Neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956): capital accumulation

FDI <a href="mailto:capital flow">capital flow</a> : complement to domestic savings
 FDI <a href="mailto:technology flow">technology flow</a> : productivity gains through spillovers

- CEE countries:
  - need to replace an obsolete capital stock
  - engaged in a competition to attract FDI

"FDI's role in capital accumulation equally important for CEEC as the introduction of new technologies in early transition?"

• Some theoretical arguments, very few empirical evidence

## Research question


# Does FDI stimulate or displace domestic investment in transition countries of CEE?

- Are the different types of FDI important?
- Does financial development play a role?

## Agenda of the presentation

- Literature review
- Data and methodology
- Results
  - Interaction of FDI with domestic investment
  - o Types of FDI
  - o Financial development
- Conclusion

### 2 mechanisms



"Collateral benefits" associated with FDI (Kose, 2006)

#### Theoretical literature

- Markusen and Venables (1999) and Barrios (2005):
  MNE in downstream sectors => within sector crowding out (-) and upstream externalities (+)
- Backer (2002): behavior of local entrepreneurs following MNE entry (-)
- Agosin and Machado (2005): new products and vertical externalities (+), conditional on the sectoral pattern of FDI inflows

## Empirical literature: mitigated results

- Marginally addressed in studies dealing with FDI-growth
  - Bosworth and Collins (1999): short term crowding-out effect
  - Mody and Murshid (2005): long-run crowding-in effect
  - Bloningen and Wang (2004): crowding-out significant only in developed countries
- Specific role of FDI in capital accumulation
  - Agosin and Machado (2005): inconclusive results for developing countries
  - Adams (2009) and Morrissey&Udomkerdmongkol (2012): FDI crowds-out DI
  - Wang (2010): the crowding-out disappears after 3 years
  - Mišun and Tomšík (2002): PL: crowding-out 1990-2000

CZ, HU: crowding-in 1993-2000

### Improvements compared to previous studies

- Extension of the empirical framework
- Focus on Central and Eastern Europe
- Separate greenfield FDI and M&A
- Tackle two interaction mechanisms : real and financial market

## Empirical framework (1)

Augmented investment function :

$$GFCF_{it} = \alpha GFCF_{it-1} + \beta_1 GDP_{it-1} + \beta_2 INT_{it} + \beta_3 FDI_{it} + \beta_4 K_{it} + \beta_5 X_{it} + v_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

#### Main variables:

- Gross fixed capital formation
- GDP growth
- Interest rate
- FDI flows

#### Capital flows *Kit*:

- Portfolio flows
- Other K flows

#### Controls Xit:

- Terms of trade
- Inflation volatility
- Financial liquidity
- Trade openness
- Labor productivity
- GMM Arellano and Bover (1995): lagged dependent variable and endogeneity between local investment and capital flows
- External instruments for capital flows: (i) regional capital flows as % of regional GDP; (ii) financial openness; (iii) U.S. interest rate; (iv) exchange rate volatility.

## Empirical framework (2)

#### **Short run effects**

•  $\beta$  < 1 : crowding- out effect

•  $\beta > 1$ : crowding-in effect

#### Long run effects

• Long-run elasticities, based on the dynamic nature of the investment function (Agosin and Machado, 2005):

$$\beta_L(FDI) = \frac{\beta_S(FDI)}{1-\alpha}$$


 $\beta_L(FDI) = \frac{\beta_S(FDI)}{1-\alpha}$  • Long run coefficients tested by a Wald test

	Short term	Long term	Impact
H1	β <sub>S</sub> < 1	β <sub>L</sub> < 1	Crowding-out
H2	β <sub>s</sub> < 1	$\beta_L > 1$	Creative distruction
Н3	$\beta_{S} > 1$	β <sub>L</sub> < 1	Temporary crowding-in
H4	$\beta_{S} > 1$	$\beta_L > 1$	Crowding-in

## Sample description

- Panel of 10 CEEC (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)
- Annual data for the period 1990-2010
- Sources: WDI, WIIW, IFS, UNCTAD, EBRD transition indicators

#### FDI stock in CEEC (% GDP)



# Results (1)

Dependant variable GFCF	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
L.GFCF	0.743***	0.572***	0.563***	0.506***
	(0.086)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.120)
L.GROWTH	0.077	0.106*	0.112*	0.174***
	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.063)
INTEREST	0.014	0.003	-0.034	0.031
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.061)
FDI	0.379***	0.297**	0.275**	0.285**
	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.117)
PORTF	0.046	0.050	0.041	0.102
	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.084)
LOANS	0.340***	0.361***	0.257**	0.292**
	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.125)
TERMS_TRADE		9.423**	13.973***	18.539***
		(4.584)	(5.305)	(5.539)
VOLAT		-0.018	-0.019	-0.004
		(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
DEV_M2		0.041	0.048	0.040
		(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.074)
W			0.098	0.085
			(0.062)	(0.063)
TRADE_OPEN				0.020
				(0.025)
Observations	139	139	128	128
Instruments	11	11	120	13
Sargan <i>p-value</i>	0.312	0.396	0.507	0.677
AR2 test <i>p-value</i>	0.407	0.474	0.668	0.825
Long run elasticity to	0.802**	0.694**	0.628*	0.578*
FDI	(0.393)	(0.345)	(0.326)	(0.337)

## Discussion (1)

- Short term coefficients < 1 hort term crowding-out</li>
- H1 hypothesis
- Long term coefficients < 1 long term crowding-out</li>
- However  $\beta_{FDI}(L) > \beta_{FDI}(S)$ : the intensity of crowding-out *decreases* with time
- Cautious interpretation, but :
  - substitution between FDI and domestic investment
  - o no long run complementarity identified

#### Greenfield FDI and M&A

- FDI usually seen as a homogeneous capital flow
- Greenfield/M&A potentially different implications for K accumulation due to the *motivation* of foreign investors

#### **Greenfield FDI**

- net addition to the K stock
- export oriented
- o interaction on the real market

#### M&A

- o no immediate addition to the K stock
- locally oriented
- Interaction on the financial market

- Greenfield contribution to capital formation not 1
- Inexistent empirical literature

# Results (2)

	(1)	(2)
L.GFCF	0.555***	0.441**
L.Grer	(0.123)	(0.182)
L.GROWTH	0.102*	0.102
L.GROWIII	(0.061)	(0.086)
INTEREST	0.006	0.005
INTEREST	(0.048)	(0.067)
FDI	0.309**	(0.007)
121	(0.131)	
M&A	(0.151)	0.313
1710021		(0.203)
GREEN		0.721***
GIEEZI.		(0.250)
PORTF	0.066	0.245
	(0.096)	(0.154)
LOANS	0.361***	0.196*
	(0.138)	(0.118)
VOLAT	-0.018	-0.001
	(0.027)	(0.039)
TERMS_TRADE	10.448**	8.839*
_	(4.902)	(5.021)
Observations	129	124
Instruments	10	11
Sargan <i>p-value</i>	0.860	0.978
AR2 p-value	0.565	0.899

	FDI	M&A	Greenfield
Long run elasticities	0.695*	0.560	1.289**
	(0.359)	(0.402)	(0.582)

## Discussion (2)

• Greenfield : short term coefficient < 1

long term coefficient > 1

Creative destruction

M&A : short term coefficient = 0

long term coefficient = 0

No contribution to K accumulation

## What about financial development?

- What mechanism is at work? Real market of financial interaction?
- Different policy implications!
- Hypothesis: financial interaction is all the more present as financial markets are developed
- M&A higher potential for financial interaction ?

## Results (3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
I CECE	0.560***	0.670***	0.446*
L.GFCF	0.568***	0.678***	0.446*
	(0.121)	(0.182)	(0.248)
L.GROWTH	0.123**	0.082	0.074
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.122)
INTEREST	0.012	-0.004	0.152
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.129)
FIN_DEV	-1.748	-0.464	-2.037
_	(1.763)	(1.827)	(3.108)
FDI	0.518*		
	(0.293)		
M&A		-0.202	
		(0.128)	
GREEN		(	1.492*
			(0.859)
FDI*FIN DEV	-0.025		
_	(0.022)		
M&A*FIN DEV	()	0.782**	
		(0.389)	
GREEN*FIN DEV			-2.167
GIGEEN TIN_BE			(1.406)
			(1.400)
Observations	136	121	126
Instruments	12	12	12
Sargan <i>p-value</i>	0.429	0.912	0.913
AR2 p-value	0.482	0.484	0.519
AK2 p-value	0.482	0.484	0.519

## Discussion (3)

- M&A interacts with domestic investment only on the financial market, leading to a crowding-in effect
- GREEN interacts with domestic investment essentially on the real market, leading to a short term crowding-out effect
- Net effect? Depends on the share M&A in total FDI and on the importance of M&A relative to the local supply of foreign currency
- Real market interaction more important that financial interaction?

#### Conclusion

- Only FDI and foreign loans have a significant contribution to capital formation, while portfolio investment has not
- FDI has a *crowding-out effect on domestic investment*: stronger on the short run and decreasing over time. No overall crowding-in
- Greenfield FDI at the origin of creative destruction
- M&A essentially a financial flow
- Real market interaction mostly for greenfield investment
- Financial market interaction only for M&A

## What policy recommendations?

- Favor greenfield FDI
- FDI entry in underdeveloped industries
- Promote export oriented FDI, conditional on local content
- Fiscal levers to stimulate reinvestment in the case of crowding-out

# Thank you for your attention