

Border Policies and Unauthorized Flows: Evidence from the Refugee Crisis in Europe

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
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The Refugee Crisis in the World and in Europe

- Persistent increase in global population of forcibly displaced individuals
- 79.5 million (UNHCR, 2019): IDP (45.7) + Refugees (26) + Asylum seekers (4.2) + Venezuelans abroad (3.6)

Figure 1 | Global forced displacement | 2009-2018



Where do they come from?


- **Refugees:** 68% from 5 countries: Siria (6.6 m), Venezuela (3.7), Afghanistan (2.7 m), South Sudan (2.2 m), Myanmar (1.1 m).

Where do they go?

- About 85% remain in developing countries (neighbouring or nearby countries)
- Only 16% in High Income Countries while 27% in Least Developed Countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda)

Europe - over the last ten years (2009-2018):

- 5.5 million asylum applications in EU28
- 3.5 million detected illegal crossings at external EU borders
- 26 thousand migrants dead/missing while crossing borders



We study the **EU response to unauthorized flows at its external borders**

- Europe expected to face strong migratory pressure [Hanson and McIntosh, 2016]
- During “refugee crisis”, emphasis first on closing borders, then on outsourcing controls
- An EU agency, Frontex, is responsible for coordinating enforcement at the external EU borders (while individual member states control their own national borders)

- Conflicting / non-aligned priorities of member states within the EU
- Migrants’ diversion towards routes further away is potentially desirable for single countries, while sub-optimal for EU as a whole
- Dublin Convention reinforces incentives for opportunistic behaviour

Three steps of our **empirical analysis**:

- 1** We document evidence of political cycle in enforcement (2009-2015)
- 2** We estimate the causal effect of enforcement on migrant flows (2009-2015)
- 3** We study deterrence and diversion effects of outsourcing border enforcement (2016 EU-Turkey deal)

Contribution:

- Border enforcement: area of public policy that absorbs vast resources but has received relatively little evaluation
- Most evidence on US-Mexico [Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999, Gathmann, 2008, Angelucci, 2012, Allen et al., 2018, Bazzi et al., 2018, Chau et al., 2020] + few papers on Europe [Friebel et al., 2018, Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019, Deiana et al., 2020, Battiston, 2020, Fasani and Weisser, 2020]

Data

We assembled an original dataset from Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency):

1 illegal border crossings:

- third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities when entering or attempting to enter illegally the EU territory
- monthly data since 2009; by country or origin and route of entry in Europe

2 joint border enforcement operations:

- Detailed info (duration, route, budget) on each implemented between Jan 2009 and Dec 2015:

1) Illegal Border Crossings





Figure: Total crossings and distribution across routes



Refugees or undocumented immigrants?



- A mix
- Asylum seekers must physically arrive in the territory of the host country in order to claim refugee status (little resettlements schemes in Europe)
- Asylum seekers generally arrive as undocumented migrants
- Economic migrants can join refugee flows

Illegal border crossings, first 15 nationalities: Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Albania, Eritrea, Kosovo, Somalia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Palestine, Algeria, Iran, Morocco

2) Frontex Joint Border Enforcement Operations

- Info on each joint border enforcement operation implemented by Frontex between Jan 2009 and Dec 2015
- **Joint operations:** participating EU countries contribute with officers, means of transport, vessels, financial resources
- **Frontex Role:** coordination and deployment of additional officers, experts, technical equipment to border areas under significant migratory pressure
- 365 joint operations: majority (247) are small return operation (e.g. coordinating charter flights) - Our focus: 37 land and 52 sea operations
- **Three alternative indicators** of EU border enforcement along route r in period t :
 - 1 num_FX_{rt} : number of active operations
 - 2 $budget_FX_{rt}$: tot budget spent
 - 3 $days_FX_{rt}$: tot number of days of active operations

2) Frontex Joint Operations



Estimating Equation

Equation derived from a **RUM (random utility model) of migration decisions** with multiple source countries, one destination country (the European Union) and multiple routes of entry

$$\ln att_{rct} = \alpha + \beta enf_{rt} + (\gamma_r \times \varphi_c) + (\varphi_c \times \tau_t) + (\gamma_r \times season_t) + \varepsilon_{rct}$$

- att_{rct} : IBCs on route r of immigrants from country c in quarter t
- enf_{rt} : border enforcement along route r in quarter t (num_FX_{rt} , $budget_FX_{rt}$ or $days_FX_{rt}$)
- route (γ_r); country (φ_c); quarter (τ_t)

FE capture: time-invariant source country-route determinant ($\gamma_r \times \varphi_c$), source country shock ($\varphi_c \times \tau_t$) and route-specific seasonality (γ_r)

Empirical Issues

1 Measurement

- *Detected* crossings
- *Positive detection effect* (more enforcement \Rightarrow more detected attempts) may conceal underlying *negative deterrence effect* (more enforcement \Rightarrow less actual attempts) \rightarrow underestimate deterrence effect

2 Endogeneity of Enforcement

- More border enforcement when/where larger inflows are expected: upward bias in OLS
- *Causal impact* of enforcement on crossings: determinants of enforcement not correlated with expected crossing
- IV strategy: political cycle in enforcement

Empirical Analysis and Results

- 1** Political Cycle in Border Enforcement?
- 2** Border Enforcement and Crossings
- 3** Outsourcing Border Enforcement: Deterrence and Diversion effects

1) Political Cycle in Border Enforcement?

- **Council of the EU**, one of its main decision-making body; responsible for the European Budget: *“the office of the Council Presidency offers its holder a privileged opportunity to shape the EU policy agenda in accordance with national interests.”* [Tallberg, 2003, p. 13].
- Evidence that holding the EU presidency allows member countries to influence the budget and its allocation (Aksoy [2010], Carnegie and Marinov [2017])
- If current EU presidency can influence the budget allocation to operations, do we observe more expenditure on “closest” routes?
- **Main IV**: Pre-determined six-months rotation of the presidency of the Council of the EU

- **First Stage:** we instrument enforcement on route r in quarter t with the linear distance of the starting point of route r from the capital city of the state holding EU presidency in each quarter ($dist_EUpresid_{rt}$)
- **Exclusion restriction:** no direct effect of holding the EU presidency on undocumented immigrants' flows

Figure: **EU presidency: Ireland (Jan-Jun 2013), Lithuania (Jul-Dec 2013), Greece (Jan-Jun 2014)**




Figure: **Enforcement and Distance from Current EU Presidency (First Stage)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	num_FX		lnbudget_FX		lndays_FX	
dist_EUpres	-0.010*** [0.003]	-0.011*** [0.002]	-0.056*** [0.009]	-0.101*** [0.023]	-0.033*** [0.006]	-0.059*** [0.015]
Route-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period	2009-15	2009-13	2009-15	2009-13	2009-15	2009-13
Observations	2,940	2,100	2,940	2,100	2,940	2,100
R-squared	0.400	0.445	0.426	0.443	0.407	0.418
IV: F-stat	15.64	21.25	41.30	19.50	30.05	15.49

Magnitude: 1 SD increase in distance implies approximately a 0.1 SD reduction in enforcement

- Evidence of allocation of more EU budget to member countries with **incoming elections** [Schneider, 2013] or with larger shares of eurosceptics [Bouvet and Dall'Erba, 2010]
- Do we observe more enforcement on routes that lead to countries with incoming national elections?
- **Alternative IV**: incoming national elections in 2-3-4 closest countries to each route ($d_elections$) + incoming elections weighted by low trust in EU (Eurobarometer; $d_elections * d_low_trustEU$)

Figure: **Enforcement and Elections (First Stage)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
		num_FX			Inbudget_FX			Indays_FX	
d_elections	-0.048 [0.068]	-0.031 [0.065]	-0.060 [0.069]	0.898*** [0.320]	0.729** [0.304]	1.154*** [0.329]	0.547** [0.210]	0.424** [0.198]	0.766*** [0.235]
F-stat	0.506	0.222	0.743	7.866	5.742	12.29	6.780	4.602	10.62
d_elect*d_low_trustEU	0.129** [0.060]	0.182*** [0.053]	0.251*** [0.038]	1.982*** [0.464]	1.894*** [0.370]	1.872*** [0.339]	1.474*** [0.286]	1.419*** [0.247]	1.399*** [0.229]
F-stat	4.577	12.05	43.95	18.26	26.16	30.49	26.58	32.98	37.44
Closest countries:	2	3	4	2	3	4	2	3	4
Route-country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940

Magnitude: 1 additional election implies a 0.2/0.3 std dev increase in enforcement

2) Border Enforcement and Crossings

- 1 Political Cycle in Border Enforcement?
- 2 **Border Enforcement and Crossings**
- 3 Outsourcing Border Enforcement: Deterrence and Diversion Effects

Figure: OLS estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
num_FX	0.100 [0.078]			0.120 [0.089]		
Inbudget_FX		-0.009 [0.011]			-0.006 [0.014]	
Indays_FX			-0.020 [0.018]			-0.015 [0.022]
Observations	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940
Route-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Figure: OLS Estimates: Sea and Land Routes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
num_FX - sea routes	0.239*** [0.072]			0.306*** [0.063]		
num_FX - land routes	-0.048 [0.139]			-0.042 [0.146]		
Inbudget_FX - sea routes		0.023** [0.011]			0.044*** [0.011]	
Inbudget_FX - land routes		-0.045*** [0.016]			-0.047*** [0.017]	
Indays_FX - sea routes			0.033* [0.018]			0.066*** [0.018]
Indays_FX - land routes			-0.072*** [0.024]			-0.075*** [0.025]
Observations	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940
Route-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Figure: 2SLS and RF Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		2SLS		RF
num_FX	-0.883** [0.345]			
lnbudget_FX		-0.158*** [0.056]		
Indays_FX			-0.266*** [0.090]	
IV: dist_EUpres				0.009** [0.003]
IV: F-stat	15.64	41.30	30.05	-
Route-country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,940	2,940	2,940	2,940

Magnitude: 1 std dev increase in enforcement leads to a 15-20% std dev reduction in log crossings

Figure: 2SLS Estimates: Sea and Land Routes





Figure: IV Estimates: Timing of Effect



Robustness Checks

- 1 Excluding peak refugee crisis years (2014-2015) or Western Balkan route [go](#)
- 2 Leave-out one country [go](#)
- 3 Changes in the set of source countries: from top10 to top20 [go](#)
- 4 Aggregate regressions [go](#)

Refugees vs. Economic migrants

- Are refugees less responsive to enforcement than economic migrants?
- To explore this issue:
 - Note that throughout the empirical analysis, country-specific push (and pull) factors are absorbed by country-time dummies
 - We can introduce interaction terms with enforcement
 - We can distinguish countries of origin that have Internally Displaced People (UNHCR Data) and those that do not
 - Alternatively, we can use the Political Terror Scale of the US State Department to identify countries subject to “state terror”
 - In both cases, we have variation across and within countries of origin

Figure: Elasticity to Enforcement: Refugees and Economic Migrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
	num_FX		lnbudget_FX		lndays_FX	
enforc	-0.843**		-0.144**		-0.245**	
	[0.360]		[0.057]		[0.092]	
enforc * (d_IDP>0)		0.707		0.316		0.444
		[0.718]		[0.246]		[0.366]
enforc * (d_IDP=0)		-2.062**		-0.445***		-0.710***
		[0.826]		[0.155]		[0.240]
Internally Displaced (y-1)	0.042**		0.042**		0.042**	
	[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.017]	
Observations	2,457	2,457	2,457	2,457	2,457	2,457
Route-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country-time dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Quarter-route dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Figure: Elasticity to Enforcement: Refugees and Economic Migrants

	(1) IV num_FX	(2) IV lnbudget_FX	(3) IV lndays_FX
enforc * Terror	0.111 [0.650]	0.139 [0.200]	0.148 [0.289]
enforc * no Terror	-1.155*** [0.424]	-0.217*** [0.079]	-0.347*** [0.122]
Observations	2,940	2,940	2,940
Route-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

3) Outsourcing Border Enforcement

- 1** Political Cycle in Border Enforcement?
- 2** Border Enforcement and Crossings
- 3** Outsourcing Border Enforcement: Deterrence and Diversion Effects


EU-Turkey deal

- On **18 March 2016**, the EU and Turkey adopted the EU-Turkey Statement, a.k.a. the **EU-Turkey deal**, designed with the purpose of deterring asylum seekers and other migrants from arriving to Europe.



- *Deterrence*: was the EU-Turkey deal effective in closing the East Mediterranean route?
- *Diversion*: did it increase crossings on the Central Mediterranean route?

Figure: Total Crossings (September 2015 - Sep 2016)



	Before	After		Before	After
East M.	126,6	3,2	Centr. M	7,8	18,9

Are crossings increasing on the Central Med route because of the EU-Turkey deal, or because of other concomitant factors?


1 Sudden increase in crossings from African countries?

⇒ Exploit information on country of origin and distinguish effect on Asian and African countries

2 Increase due to seasonality (spring and summer season)?

⇒ Exploit info on crossings in previous years in DID approach

Figure: Main Asian countries: Total Crossings (Sept. 2015 - Sept. 2016)



DID approach:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln att_{ct} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 POST(Apr - Sep) + \beta_2 year2016 + \\ & + \beta_3 POST(Apr - Sep) \times year2016 + \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{ct} \end{aligned}$$

- *year2016*: dummy for 2016 year
- *POST(Apr - Sep)*: dummy = 1 for April-September, 0 otherwise


Estimate equation separately:

- 1 for East Med and Central Med;
- 2 Asians and Africans;
- 3 over alternative pre-periods.

Figure: DID Estimates - Aggregate Crossings

	Asian countries			African countries		
	East Mediterranean					
post	0.521			-0.038		
	[0.369]			[0.199]		
post_2016	-3.418***	-4.475***	-5.476***	-0.454*	-1.031***	-1.064***
	[0.471]	[0.567]	[0.792]	[0.261]	[0.181]	[0.310]
	Central Mediterranean					
post	1.330***			1.486***		
	[0.314]			[0.374]		
post_2016	2.509**	2.070**	2.161*	-0.429	-1.239*	-0.746
	[1.066]	[0.755]	[1.028]	[0.463]	[0.626]	[0.419]
Observations	48	48	24	48	48	24
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Month FE	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Start year	2012	2012	2014	2012	2012	2014

Figure: DID coeff. on Central Med - Asian Countries: leave out one country




Conclusions


- We analyze data on illegal border crossings at the external EU borders between 2009 and 2015
- We deal with the endogeneity of enforcement with two alternative instrumental variable strategies based on the political economy of enforcement policy in the EU
- We find that higher enforcement on one route reduces crossings on the same route and possibly diverts crossings towards other routes
- The effect is present only on land routes. Results on sea routes are not conclusive - though we can rule out pull effects
- We find a sizeable diversion effect of closing one route (after the 2016 EU-Turkey deal)

Appendix

Table 3: Illegal crossings: top 5 nationalities by route

<i>Central Medit</i>			<i>Circular</i>			<i>Eastern borders</i>		
<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>
Eritrea	86,435	0.21	Albania	107,111	0.95	Moldova	1,459	0.15
Syrian Arab Republic	59,697	0.14	Afghanistan	1,782	0.02	Georgia	1,382	0.15
Nigeria	41,154	0.10	Iraq	1,151	0.01	Afghanistan	1,286	0.14
Tunisia	35,911	0.09	Palestine	817	0.01	Vietnam	1,123	0.12
Somalia	30,773	0.07	Somalia	303	0.00	Russian Federation	770	0.08
<i>Share of total</i>		0.60			0.99			0.63
<i>East Medit - land</i>			<i>East Medit - sea</i>			<i>West African</i>		
<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>
Afghanistan	53,600	0.30	Syrian Arab Republic	522,771	0.54	Morocco	978	0.23
Syrian Arab Republic	27,626	0.15	Afghanistan	243,006	0.25	Guinea	737	0.17
Pakistan	21,032	0.12	Iraq	91,504	0.09	Mali	655	0.15
Algeria	12,785	0.07	Pakistan	24,931	0.03	Cote d'Ivoire	432	0.10
Iraq	10,865	0.06	Iran, Islamic Rep.	23,494	0.02	Gambia, The	292	0.07
<i>Share of total</i>		0.70			0.93			0.73
<i>West Medit - land</i>			<i>West Medit - sea</i>			<i>Western Balkan</i>		
<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>	<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>Illegal crossings</i>	<i>Share</i>
Algeria	3,689	0.43	Algeria	8,841	0.30	Syrian Arab Republic	381,810	0.45
Morocco	1,041	0.12	Morocco	3,056	0.11	Afghanistan	221,900	0.26
Cameroon	863	0.10	Guinea	2,661	0.09	Pakistan	75,215	0.09
Mali	728	0.08	Cameroon	2,418	0.08	Kosovo	57,328	0.07
Syrian Arab Republic	405	0.05	Cote d'Ivoire	1,504	0.05	Iraq	27,715	0.03
<i>Share of total</i>		0.78			0.64			0.91





Theoretical Framework


- RUM (random utility model) of migration decisions with multiple source countries (c), one destination country (EU) and multiple routes of entry (r)
- Linear form of cost C_{crt} of migrating through route r from country c in time t :

$$C_{crt} = \beta_1 e_{rt} + \beta_2 h_r + \beta_3 d_{cr}$$


- e_{rt} : enforcement on route r in time t ;
 - h_r : measure of route dangerousness;
 - d_{cr} : distance between the source country c and the route r .
- Migrate if value from migration $V_{icrt} > 0$ for at least one route:

$$V_{icrt} = U_{ct}^{EU} - C_{crt} + u_{icrt}$$

Suppose there are two routes, A and B



If enforcement on A increases to $e'_A > e_A$, then $\Delta C_A > 0$:



Further, assume:

$$u_{icrt} = \theta_{rt} + \varepsilon_{icrt}$$

where:

- θ_{rt} : unobservable route-time shock
- ε_{icrt} : idiosyncratic component; i.i.d. (i.i.d.) type I extreme value

The share of immigrants from country c choosing route r in time t is (multinomial logit):

$$sh_{crt} = \frac{\exp(U_{ct}^{EU} - (\beta_1 e_{rt} + \beta_2 h_r + \beta_3 d_{cr}) + \theta_{rt})}{\sum_r \exp(U_{ct}^{EU} - (\beta_1 e_{rt} + \beta_2 h_r + \beta_3 d_{cr}) + \theta_{rt})}$$

Finally, assume observed shares SH_{crt} are equal to the population shares plus a multiplicative error term. Taking logs:

$$\ln SH_{crt} = U_{ct}^{EU} - (\beta_1 e_{rt} + \beta_2 h_r + \beta_3 d_{cr}) + \theta_{rt} - \ln A_{ct} + \nu_{crt}$$

where A_{ct} : denominator of sh_{crt} .

Estimating equation:

$$\ln SH_{crt} = \beta_1 e_{rt} + \mu_{ct} + \tau_r + \rho_{cr} + \theta_{rt} + \nu_{crt}$$

- Non route-time variation absorbed by fixed effects
- However, θ_{rt} may be correlated with the level of enforcement e_{rt} - more on this later

Measurement Issues: Detection Effect

- What do we learn about underlying attempts by studying detected attempts?
- The number of detected attempts along route r in year t is:

$$att_{rt}^D = p_{rt}^D * att_{rt} = p_{rt}^D * p_t^r * att_t$$

p_{rt}^D : detection probability on route r ; att_{rt} attempts on route r ; p_t^r : share of attempts choosing route r ; att_t : total number of attempts.

- The elasticity of detected attempts along route r to enforcement along the same route:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \ln att_{rt}^D}{\partial \ln enf_{rt}} &= \frac{\partial \ln p_{rt}^D}{\partial \ln enf_{rt}} + \frac{\partial \ln p_t^r}{\partial \ln enf_{rt}} + \frac{\partial \ln att_t}{\partial \ln enf_{rt}} \\ &= \mathbf{detection} (\geq 0) + \mathbf{diversion} (\leq 0) + \mathbf{deterrence} (\leq 0)\end{aligned}$$

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EU Presidency

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Year	Semester	Country
2009	Jan–Jun	Czech Republic
2009	Jul–Dec	Sweden
2010	Jan–Jun	Spain
2010	Jul–Dec	Belgium
2011	Jan–Jun	Hungary
2011	Jul–Dec	Poland
2012	Jan–Jun	Denmark
2012	Jul–Dec	Cyprus
2013	Jan–Jun	Ireland
2013	Jul–Dec	Lithuania
2014	Jan–Jun	Greece
2014	Jul–Dec	Italy
2015	Jan–Jun	Latvia
2015	Jul–Dec	Luxembourg
2016	Jan–Jun	Netherlands
2016	Jul–Dec	Slovakia
2017	Jan–Jun	Malta
2017	Jul–Dec	Estonia

Routes: closest destination countries

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Ranking	Route					
	Central Medit	Eastern borders	East Medit	West African	West Medit	Western Balkan
1	Malta	Lithuania	Cyprus	Portugal	Portugal	Bulgaria
2	Italy	Romania	Romania	Spain	Spain	Greece
3	Greece	Latvia	Greece	Malta	France	Romania
4	Croatia	Poland	Bulgaria	France	United Kingdom	Hungary
5	Slovenia	Bulgaria	Hungary	Ireland	Ireland	Croatia

Figure: 2SLS Estimates: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2009-2013			No Western Balkan		
num_FX	-0.813*			-0.637*		
	[0.457]			[0.316]		
Inbudget_FX		-0.089*			-0.153*	
		[0.045]			[0.076]	
Indays_FX			-0.152**			-0.242**
			[0.075]			[0.116]
IV: F-stat	21.25	19.50	15.49	27.67	88.56	73.74
Route-country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quarter-route	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,100	2,100	2,100	2,520	2,520	2,520

Figure: IV Estimates: Leave-Out one Country





Figure: IV Estimates: Changing Set of Top Countries (top10-top20)



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